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FOREWORD 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: 
IDEAS FROM THE ACADEMY 
NEIL S. SIEGEL* 
The Supreme Court of the United States may issue a momentous decision in 
June 2012.1 The Court’s intervention became nearly certain when the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit invalidated a key provision of 
the new federal healthcare law,2 thereby creating a split of authority on the 
constitutionality of the provision with two other federal courts of appeals.3 
Everyone living in the United States has at least a financial stake in the 
eventual outcome of the litigation. Many people have additional stakes, 
whether political, moral, or jurisprudential. 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA),4 signed into law by 
President Barack Obama on March 23, 2010, is “the biggest expansion of the 
social safety net in more than four decades, providing greater economic security 
to millions of poor and working-class families.”5 Two primary concerns moved 
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 1.  Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), 
cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011), cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 
604 (2011). The Court granted certiorari on four questions: (1) whether the federal Tax Anti-Injunction 
Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), bars pre-enforcement challenges to the minimum coverage provision; (2) 
whether Congress had the power under Article I, Section 8 to enact the minimum coverage provision; 
(3) whether the minimum coverage provision, if unconstitutional, is severable from all or some other 
provisions of the ACA; and (4) whether it is unconstitutionally coercive under South Dakota v. Dole, 
483 U.S. 203 (1987), for Congress to condition all existing federal Medicaid funding on the states’ 
acceptance of new expansions to the Medicaid program. 
 2.  Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1235 (invalidating the ACA’s minimum coverage 
provision as beyond the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers).  
 3.  See Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 
F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011). In view of the invalidation and the circuit split, the Court’s criteria for 
certiorari were twice satisfied. See U.S. SUP. CT. RULE 10. There is also a circuit split on the question 
whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to decide the constitutional questions. See infra note 16 
(discussing the Fourth Circuit’s decision with respect to the federal Tax Anti-Injunction Act). 
 4.  Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 
42 U.S.C.); see Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 
1029 (2010). 
 5.  THE STAFF OF THE WASHINGTON POST, LANDMARK: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA’S 
NEW HEALTH-CARE LAW AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US ALL 66–67 (2010) [hereinafter 
“LANDMARK”]. 
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the President and Congress to act. These concerns have dominated debates 
over health policy in the United States since the end of World War II.6 First, 
Congress wanted to gain control over the increasing costs of healthcare. 
Although national healthcare spending was only 5.4% of gross domestic 
product (or $200 billion) in 1960, such spending amounted to 16.2% of GDP (or 
$2.3 trillion) by 2007 and is projected to be 20.3% of GDP (or $4.4 trillion) by 
2018.7 Second, Congress wanted to reduce the number of people living without 
health insurance in the United States. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 
around nineteen percent of the nonelderly population, or roughly fifty million 
people, lacked health insurance in 2009.8 
To address these two concerns, the ACA seeks, among many other things, 
to achieve near-universal health insurance coverage. The law encourages, and 
helps, American citizens and other legal residents to obtain adequate and 
affordable health insurance. The Congressional Budget Office projects that the 
Act will increase the number of nonelderly individuals who possess insurance 
by roughly thirty-three million by 2019.9 If the law operates as intended, around 
ninety-five percent of all legal residents will be insured.10 
Although the ACA contains many provisions, the multitude of legal 
challenges to the statute focus primarily on the constitutionality of the 
minimum coverage provision, also known as the “individual mandate” by its 
critics. The provision requires most individuals lawfully living in the United 
States to either obtain a certain level of health insurance coverage or make a 
yearly “shared responsibility payment,” which the statute calls a “penalty.”11 
The most significant constitutional question that is emerging in litigation is 
whether the provision is within the scope of at least one source of congressional 
power in Article I, Section 8. The potential candidates are the tax power,12 the 
Commerce Clause,13 and the Necessary and Proper Clause.14 
To date, no federal court has upheld the minimum coverage provision as 
within the scope of the tax power.15 By contrast, the federal courts disagree 
 
 6.  See, e.g., CHARLES E. PHELPS, HEALTH ECONOMICS 529 (4th ed. 2010) (“It would probably 
be fair to say that, at least over the post-World War II era, U.S. health policy has emphasized a 
balancing of two concerns: access to care and control of costs.”).  
 7.  LANDMARK, supra note 5, at 64. See PHELPS, supra note 6, at 530 (“In constant dollars per 
capita, total spending is estimated to have increased more than 8-fold between 1960 and 2010, and the 
comparable spending increase for drugs is almost 10-fold for that period.”). 
 8.  Census Bureau Report, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 
2009, at 23, table 8; see PHELPS, supra note 6, at 531 (“Recent estimates put the number of Americans 
without insurance at 47 million in 2006, representing 17% of people under 65. The rate of uninsurance 
climbs to 30% for the 18- to 24-year-old population.”). 
 9.  Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf to John Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 
(Feb. 18, 2011).  
 10.  LANDMARK, supra note 5, at 73. 
 11.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1).  
 12.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 13.  Id. § 8, cl. 3. 
 14.  Id. § 8, cl. 18. 
 15.  But cf. Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915, at *16 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 
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about whether the provision is within the scope of the Commerce Clause, either 
alone or in combination with the Necessary and Proper Clause.16 Three district 
courts and two courts of appeals rejected commerce power challenges to the 
minimum coverage provision, reasoning that going without insurance is 
economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. These courts 
held alternatively that the minimum coverage provision is necessary and proper 
to carrying into execution the ACA’s commerce power regulations of the 
insurance industry.17 
Three other district courts and another court of appeals held that the 
minimum coverage provision is beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause. 
These courts reasoned that Congress may regulate only economic activity using 
its commerce power, and that the minimum coverage provision regulates only 
the inactivity of declining to purchase health insurance. These courts also held 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause could not save the provision.18 
The articles published in this volume of Law and Contemporary Problems 
address the constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision, either directly 
or indirectly. They were originally presented at a conference at Duke Law 
School on September 16, 2011. Entitled “The Constitutionality of the 
Affordable Care Act: Ideas from the Academy,” the conference was inspired by 
the belief that legal academics who specialize in U.S. constitutional law, health 
 
2011) (Wynn, J., concurring) (“[W]ere I to reach the merits, I would uphold the constitutionality of the 
Affordable Care Act on the basis that Congress had the authority to enact the individual and employer 
mandates under its plenary taxing power.”). For an argument that the ACA exaction for non-insurance 
is a tax for purposes of Congress’s tax power, see generally Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the 
Power to Destroy: A Theory of the Tax Power for a Court that Limits the Commerce Power, 99 VA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
 16.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit did not reach the merits of any of 
these questions, ruling for the federal government on jurisdictional grounds. See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. 
Geithner, No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) (holding that the federal Tax Anti-
Injunction Act (TAIA) bars the action); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 
2011) (holding that Virginia lacks Article III standing to bring the action). Other courts have disagreed 
with the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that the TAIA bars pre-enforcement challenges to the minimum 
coverage provision. The Supreme Court’s view of the TAIA will determine whether it reaches the 
merits. The contributions to this volume do not address the jurisdictional question. For an argument 
that the TAIA does not bar the present challenges to the minimum coverage provision regardless of 
whether the ACA exaction for non-insurance is deemed a TAIA “tax,” see generally Michael C. Dorf 
& Neil S. Siegel, “Early-Bird Special” Indeed!: Why the Tax Anti-Injunction Act Permits the Present 
Challenges to the Minimum Coverage Provision, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 389 (2012), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/01/19/dorf&siegel.html. 
 17.  See Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d sub nom, Seven-Sky v. Holder, 
661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 
10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 
882 (E.D. Mich. 2010), aff’d, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 18.  Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 656 F.3d 
253 (4th Cir. 2011); Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 
(N.D. Fla. 2011), order clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom., Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), 
cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011), cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 
604 (2011); Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 811 F. Supp. 2d 1086, (M.D. Pa. 
2011). 
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law and policy, or statutory interpretation are making distinctive contributions 
to the national debate over the constitutionality of the ACA.19 
Some of these legal academics are able appellate lawyers, but that is not the 
only source of their contributions. These academics are less constrained by their 
clients or their offices than are other legal actors, they are blessed with the time 
to study constitutional doctrine or health law for a living, and they often possess 
interdisciplinary expertise that is pertinent to the proper resolution of legal 
problems. 
To be sure, these characteristics of legal academics can be vices when 
exhibited in the practice of constitutional adjudication—particularly if creative 
impulses and theoretical ambitions are undisciplined by the necessity of 
deciding particular cases soundly. But these attributes can be virtues as well. 
Among many other activities, legal academics conduct original historical 
research, perceive connections among constitutional doctrines or provisions 
that have previously gone unnoticed, use relevant methods or insights of other 
disciplines to shed light on legal problems, and bring to bear their specialized 
legal knowledge to help courts of general jurisdiction decide between the client-
centered arguments of generalist appellate lawyers.20 
These contributions can be relevant to the outcome of constitutional and 
statutory cases. This may help to explain why the Justices routinely cite the 
work of legal academics.21 Both the data and casual empiricism attest to the 
real-world relevance of much legal academic writing.22 
The authors of the following articles, as well as the participants in the 
companion conference, collectively exhibit the qualities noted above.23 Included 
 
 19.  For a useful collection of legal academic writing on the constitutionality of the ACA, see ACA 
Litigation Blog, Some Essential Reading, http://acalitigationblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/some-essential-
reading.html.  
 20.  On the last point, see, for example, Brief of Deborah A. DeMott as Amica Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Maples v. Thomas, No. 10-63 (informing the U.S. Supreme Court of the views of a leading 
academic authority on agency law regarding whether a procedural default attributable in fact to the pro 
bono attorneys of a death row inmate seeking federal habeas relief is in law attributable to the inmate 
himself). The Court applied principles of agency law in ruling 7–2 in favor of the inmate. Maples v. 
Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012). 
 21.  See Lee Petherbridge & David L. Schwartz, An Empirical Assessment of the Supreme Court’s 
Use of Legal Scholarship, 106 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (analyzing the Court’s use of legal 
scholarship between 1949 and 2009, and finding that the Court cited such scholarship in 32.21% of its 
decisions during that period; that it has referenced legal scholarship more frequently in recent years; 
and that it is more likely to cite academic writing in the most important and contentious cases, including 
when the Court is closely divided, when its decision alters existing precedent, and when it holds 
legislation unconstitutional). 
 22.  Accord David F. Levi, Dean’s Message, 29 DUKE LAW MAG., no. 2 (Summer 2011), 
http://www.law.duke.edu/magazine/story?id=6659&u=56 (“Although there may be [legal] academic 
scholarship that is primarily of interest to other academics, . . . I submit that the legal scholarship 
produced and fostered by Duke Law faculty and students is of very great importance to lawyers and 
judges.”).  
 23.  In addition to the authors of the articles in this volume, conference participants included 
Matthew Adler, Jack Balkin, Guy Charles, Robert Cooter, James Boyle, Gillian Metzger, Abigail 
Moncrieff, Arti Rai, and Barak Richman. 
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in their ranks are experts in U.S. constitutional doctrine, theory, and history; 
experts in health law and policy; legal economists; and legal scholars with 
substantial training in ideas and methods of modern economics and political 
science. This introduction, however, cannot offer much more than assertions. 
The proof is in the publications that follow. 
Some of these papers adopt the internal perspective of the faithful legal 
practitioner. They inquire whether the minimum coverage provision is within 
the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution. Thus Erwin Chemerinsky, Stephen Sachs, and Neil Siegel 
examine some or all of the potential constitutional bases for the minimum 
coverage provision from the perspective of legal doctrine and with help from 
social science.24 
Stuart Benjamin, Joseph Blocher, Ilya Somin, and Mark Hall address two 
constitutional objections to the minimum coverage provision. The first 
objection stresses “slippery slopes.” This is the concern that upholding the 
minimum coverage provision would justify and produce a variety of future 
federal mandates, economic or otherwise. Professor Somin argues that this 
objection is fatal to the minimum coverage provision.25 Professor Hall disagrees, 
stressing instead that invalidating the provision could disable the federal 
government from exercising the “very power [that] might someday be 
absolutely essential to saving a million or more lives, based on solid public 
health science, in the event of a catastrophic public health emergency.”26 
The second objection to the minimum coverage provision involves 
“bootstrapping.”27 This is the concern that upholding the provision only because 
of its relationship to other ACA provisions or other federal laws would allow 
Congress to expand its constitutional authority by imposing regulations that 
would be unconstitutional if imposed by themselves.28 Professors Benjamin and 
Blocher reject this objection. 
Other contributions to the volume broaden the interpretive perspective 
from which the ACA litigation may be viewed.29 They adopt the external 
 
 24.  See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Ideology and Constitutional Decision-Making: The 
Coming Example of the Affordable Care Act, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2012 at 1; Stephen E. 
Sachs, The Uneasy Case for the Affordable Care Act, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2012 at 17; 
Neil S. Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence: Collective Action Federalism and the Minimum Coverage 
Provision, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2012 at 29. 
 25.  See generally Ilya Somin, A Mandate for Mandates: Is the Individual Health Insurance Case a 
Slippery Slope?, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2012 at 75.  
 26.  Mark A. Hall, Constitutional Mortality: Precedential Effects of Striking the Individual Mandate, 
75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2012 at 107, 107.  
 27.  See generally Stuart M. Benjamin, Bootstrapping, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2012 at 
115; Joseph Blocher, What We Fret About When We Fret About Bootstrapping, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 3, 2012 at 145. 
 28.  More generally, Professor Benjamin focuses on situations in which “an actor undertakes 
permissible action Y and thereby renders its action Z legally permissible, as the actor’s undertaking of 
Z absent Y would raise serious legal problems.” Benjamin, supra note 27, at 116. 
 29.  Professor Chemerinsky also broadens his interpretive perspective in part of his contribution, 
arguing that “the outcome [of the ACA litigation] in the Supreme Court is very much in doubt because 
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perspective of the analyst of the constitutional system.30 Thus Ernest Young and 
Bryan Leitch examine the relationship between constitutional doctrine and the 
Constitution outside the courts, inquiring whether the plaintiffs in the ACA 
litigation are engaged in conservative popular constitutionalism. They further 
examine whether such social movement advocacy is compatible with fidelity to 
law, and whether political conditions in the United States make it likely that 
this advocacy will succeed in changing the content of constitutional doctrine.31 
Theodore Ruger also privileges the external point of view by exploring 
problems with the U.S. healthcare system that will endure however this 
litigation is resolved by the federal courts.32 He views the current debate over 
the ACA as part of an ongoing process of contestation about the proper locus 
of medical authority in America that dates back to the 1800s. 
On behalf of Duke Law School, I thank the friends and colleagues who 
participated in this project, whether at the conference or in writing. I am also 
grateful to the editors of Law and Contemporary Problems for their excellent 
work in bringing the conference articles to print. 
We are all indebted to Dana Norvell of Duke Law School’s Program in 
Public Law. She ensured that everyone made it to the conference, that they had 
a nice place to stay and good food to eat when they got there, and that the 
conference proceedings themselves went off without a hitch. 
Dean David Levi has been unwavering in his support of worthwhile 
intellectual endeavors at Duke Law School. These endeavors include events of 
simultaneous significance to the bench, the bar, the academy, and the public. 
Finally, I am honored to acknowledge Rick Horvitz, Duke Law Class of 
1978. His profound generosity makes possible the Program in Public Law, 
which in turn makes possible projects like this one. 
Happy reading. 
 
 
of the way in which the constitutional issue has come to be defined by political ideology.” Chemerinsky, 
supra note 24, at 2. 
 30.  For an examination of the internal and external points of view in constitutional law, see 
generally Neil S. Siegel, Jack Balkin’s Rich Historicism and Diet Originalism: Health Benefits and Risks 
for the Constitutional System, 111 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, 
Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring 
Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1473 (2007).  
 31.  See generally Ernest A. Young, Popular Constitutionalism and the Underenforcement Problem: 
The Case of the National Healthcare Law, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2012 at 157; Bryan J. 
Leitch, Where Law Meets Politics: Freedom of Contract, Federalism, and the Fight Over Health Care, 27 
J.L. & POL. 177 (2011). Mr. Leitch, a third-year law student at Duke, participated in the conference and 
contributed this article to the proceedings. His article would have been published in this volume had it 
not already been slated for publication elsewhere. He has instead contributed a response to Professor 
Young. See generally Bryan Leitch, On the Difficulty of Separating Law & Politics: Federalism & the 
Affordable Care Act, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2012 at 203. 
 32.  See generally Theodore Ruger, Of Icebergs and Glaciers: The Submerged Constitution of 
American Healthcare, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2012 at 215. 
